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Este trabalho versa sobre a transparência nas redes de franquia, em especial 
os deveres de informação ao nível da formação dos acordos de franquia. 
Tendo em conta a sua caraterização básica, os elementos principais e as 
obrigações das partes, destaca-se em sede de formação destes contratos o 
princípio da boa-fé como fundamento de deveres de informação e de 
esclarecimento, cuja inobservância é suscetível de gerar responsabilidade pré-
contratual por culpa in contrahendo. Por outro lado, se franquiador utilizar 
cláusulas contratuais gerais fica sujeito aos deveres de comunicação e de 
informação ao nível da formação do acordo, nos termos do regime jurídico dos 
contratos de adesão. São ainda referidos alguns instrumentos de soft law, tais 
como o Código Europeu de Ética no Franchising e a Unidroit Model Franchise 
Disclosure Law, como meios de transparência e disclosure nas redes de 
franquia. Para terminar, sugere-se que, por razões de segurança juridical e de 
proteção do franquiado como parte negocial mais fraca, justificar-se-iam regras 
específicas para os contratos de distribuição no que respeita em especial aos 
deveres pré-contratuais de informação nos contratos de franquia. 
 
Contratos; franchising; transparência; deveres de informação; responsabilidade 
pré-contratual. 
 
This paper addresses transparency in business networks, notably pre-
contractual disclosure obligations in franchising agreements. Taking into 
account basic features, main elements and obligations of the parties, in the 
absence of regulation specific to franchising contracts the principle of good faith 
is outlined as a source of duties of disclosure and information, the violation of 
which is capable to originate pre-contractual liability for culpa in contrahendo. 
Moreover, where franchisors use standard terms they have to comply with 
special duties of communication and clarification according to the regulation of 
standard terms. Reference is also made to soft law instruments such as the 
European Code of Ethics in franchising and the UNIDROIT Model Franchise 
Disclosure Law, as relevant tools for achieving transparency and disclosure in 
franchising networks. Finally it is suggested that for reasons of legal certainty 
and protection of franchisee as the weaker party, and taking into account 
comparative experiences, a regulation specific of distribution agreements could 
be justified concerning notably pre-contractual disclosure obligations in 
franchising agreements. 
 
 
                                                          
 This paper originated as national report for the research project ‘Transparency and 
franchise networks - comparative law’ and later evolved as communication to the International 
Symposium Disclosure in Business Networks, org. Prof. Dr. J.I. Ruiz Peris, 8/9 November 2012, 
University of Valencia, Spain. 
 Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. 
Introduction 
Franchising networks play an important role in Portuguese business life 
where different kinds of franchising agreements are concluded. 
Franchising has advantages and disadvantages for both parties. 
Franchisers can enter into new markets without the costs and risks of 
establishment of setting up a business that otherwise they would have to take. It 
is up to franchisees to bear the costs of establishment, such as, for ex., labor 
and social security, rents, insurance, utilities. Moreover, based upon their 
industrial and intellectual property rights and know-how secrets, franchisers can 
exercise control over the activity of the franchisee, by means of contract terms 
which give franchisers almost full control over the franchisee. 
As for the franchisee, despite his possible situation of economic 
dependence, he has the chance to explore a presumably well-succeeded and 
goodwill business and clientele. In order to enter into the franchising network 
the franchisee has to pay an initial fee and then periodic royalties for the use of 
the licensed business system, including know-how, trademarks and other 
intellectual property rights. 
 
1. General features and special types of franchising 
Despite the variety of these agreements and the relevant role played by 
franchising networks in the modernization of business and commercial life, 
Portuguese legislation does not define nor provide a special regulation for 
franchising contracts.1 
In Pronuptia, the European Court of Justice has pointed out the main 
features and distinguished three species of franchising agreements: production, 
distribution and/or services2. Later on, Commission Regulation 4087/88 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements 
provided that “franchise agreements consist essentially of licenses of industrial 
or intellectual property rights relating to trademarks or signs and know-how, 
which can be combined with restrictions relating to supply or purchase of 
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 António Menezes Cordeiro, ‘Do contrato de franquia (franchising): autonomia privada 
versus tipicidade negocial’, ROA 48 (1988), p. 63-84; António Pinto Monteiro, Contratos de 
agência, de concessão e de franquia («franchising»), Coimbra 1989, p. 27, Id. Contratos de 
distribuição comercial, Coimbra, 2009, p. 62-63.  
2
 Judgment of 28 January 1986, C-161/84, ECR 1986, p. 353.  
goods” (Recital 2). This Regulation has also defined franchise itself as “a 
package of industrial or intellectual property rights relating to trademarks, trade 
names, shop signs, utility models, designs, copyrights, know-how or patents, to 
be exploited for the resale of goods or the provision of services to end users” 
(Article 1(3)(a)). 
Moreover, concerning special types of franchising, this Regulation 
identified three main types according to their object and distinguished franchise 
agreements from master franchising agreements. In fact, Recital 3 of this 
Commission Regulation reads, on one hand, that “[several types of franchise 
can be distinguished according to their object: industrial franchise concerns the 
manufacturing of goods, distribution franchise concerns the sale of goods, and 
service franchise concerns the supply of services.” On the other hand, franchise 
agreement is defined as an agreement whereby one undertaking, the 
franchisor, grants the other, the franchisee, in exchange for direct or indirect 
financial consideration, the right to exploit a franchise for the purposes of 
marketing specified types of goods and/or services, including at least 
obligations relating to: the use of a common name or shop sign and a uniform 
presentation of contract premises and/or means of transport (a), the 
communication by the franchisor to the franchisee of know-how (b), the 
continuing provision by the franchisor to the franchisee of commercial or 
technical assistance during the life of the agreement (c). As for the master 
franchise agreement it is considered an agreement whereby one undertaking, 
the franchisor, grants the other, the master franchisee, in exchange of direct or 
indirect financial consideration, the right to exploit a franchise for the purposes 
of concluding franchise agreements with third parties, the franchisees3. 
In short, in master franchising the franchiser grants a license to the 
franchisee in order to set up, manage and control a franchise network in a 
certain territory; in (servant) franchising, the franchiser himself - or the master 
franchisee - grant licenses to end franchisees to explore the business system 
by setting up a franchise establishment in a certain area and timeframe.4 
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 Commission Regulation 4087/88, Article 1(3)(b)(c). 
4
 On master franchising see notably Jaume Martí Miravalls, El Contrato de Master 
Franquicia, Madrid, 2009. 
This Regulation was in force until 31 December 1990 and it was then 
replaced by Commission Regulation 2790/1999, which in turn has been 
replaced by Commission Regulation 330/2010 on vertical agreements and 
concerted practices. Nonetheless, the main features and types of franchising 
agreements had already been pointed out in Pronuptia and in Commission 
Regulation 4087/88. 
In Portuguese doctrine and jurisprudence, franchising is considered a 
business method of vertical integration by which the franchiser integrates the 
franchisee into a business network. This integration takes place through 
franchising contracts, by which the franchiser grants to the franchisees, against 
a direct or indirect payment (initial fee + periodical royalties), in a certain zone 
or territory and in a stable period of time, the right to exploit a business system 
(franchise) of producing and/or selling certain goods or providing services, 
under and/or according to the franchiser’s entrepreneurial image, know-how, 
technical assistance, and control5.6 
 
2. Main elements of franchising agreements 
Franchising contracts, as acknowledged by jurisprudence and literature, 
present basic elements, such as: 
a) contracting parties are the franchiser and the franchisee; 
b) the object of the contract is a license to exploit a business 
system of production and/or sale of goods and/or provision of services; 
c) the exploitation of the franchise is granted for a certain zone 
or territory and for a stable period of time and usually in terms of 
exclusivity and non-competition; 
                                                          
5
 António Pinto Monteiro, Contratos de distribuição comercial, cit., pp. 117-125, with 
further references. See e.g. also L. Miguel Pestana de Vasconcelos, O contrato de franquia 
(franchising), 2ª ed., Coimbra, 2010, pp. 23 seg., J. Engrácia Antunes, Direito dos contratos 
comerciais, Coimbra, 2009, p. 451. 
6
 As recent domestic case-law see notably Supreme Court of Justice, judgments of 9 
January 2007 (Proc. 06A4416), 23 January 2010 (Proc. 589/06.OTVPRT.P1), 19 October 2010 
(Proc. 2114/06.4TVPRT.P1.S1), 15 December 2011 (Proc. 1807/08.6TVLSB.L1.S1); Lisbon 
Court of Appeals, judgment of 21 January 2010 (Proc. 1209/08.4TJLSB.L1-2). In its judgment of 
14 February 2012 (Proc. 3863/07.5TBVIS.C1), the Coimbra Court of Appeals summarized the 
usual elements of franchising agreements as follows: a) licenses of trademarks and other 
distinctive signs of the franchiser and eventually a patent license; b) transmission of know-how; 
c) franchiser’s technical assistance to the franchisee; d) franchisee’s activity control by the 
franchiser; e) money payments by the franchisee to the franchisor. Available at www.dgsi.pt. 
d) obligations of confidentiality and respect for the franchiser’s 
know-how;  
e) the franchise is run under the franchiser’s signs and trade-
dress, and according to his know-how and technical assistance, including 
advertising and marketing; 
f)  in order to protect the franchiser’s good-will and reputation 
or to maintain the common identity and reputation of the franchise 
network, the franchisee may be bound to contract the equipment, the 
installations and the suppliers of goods or services to be used in the 
assembly or in the functioning of the franchise as established by the 
franchiser; 
g) the franchisee pays as remuneration an initial fee (or 
admittance entry fee) plus periodic royalties. 
 
3. Obligations of the parties 
Both franchisers and franchisees assume obligations in franchising 
contracts. As for the franchiser, the main obligation is to allow the franchisee to 
use the franchising distinctive signs and know-how (1), to provide him with 
training (2), to ensure the advertising of the franchise network at regional and 
international levels (3), to supply or to ensure the supply of goods that are 
necessary to run the franchise (4), to inform franchisees of any change in the 
running of the enterprise, namely the composition and presentation of the goods 
and conditions of sale (5), to supervise the franchise network, namely 
controlling and verifying the performance, by other franchisees, of duties 
designed to ensure the common identity and the reputation of the franchise 
network such as the obligation not to contract supply outside the network (6). 
As for the franchisee, he has a special duty of care concerning the identity, 
image and good will of the franchise, including duties of negative action, such 
as confidentiality, non-competition and not to make advertising without previous 
authorization of the franchiser (1). The franchisee also has the obligation to 
communicate to the franchiser any new experience gained from running the 
franchise that amounts to an improvement to its conditions of functioning and 
efficiency and to authorize the franchiser and other franchisees the use such 
know-how (2). Moreover, franchisees have to pay the agreed remuneration 
(entrance fee and periodic royalties) (3), to use the franchiser’s IP objects (4), to 
follow his instructions concerning equipment and uniform presentation of 
premises and means of transport and to pursue the objective specifications of 
quality (5), to observe resale prices recommend by the franchiser (6), to provide 
post sales assistance to clients allowing the principal to inspect replacement 
parts and working methods used by his auxiliaries in the provision of post-sales 
assistance (7), to provide all information he may be asked, namely on the 
market situation and perspectives of evolution (8), to attend periods of training 
organized by the franchiser, as stipulated in the contract (9); franchisees may 
also assume obligations of minimum sale (10). 
 
4. Formation of franchising contracts: general framework 
Portuguese private law as codified in the Code Civil and related special 
acts provides special regulation for a wide range of contracts, such as, for ex., 
sale, donation, company, rental, borrow, services, agency, and work contracts. 
However, franchising contracts are legally deemed atypical contracts in 
Portuguese law. Domestic legislation does not name nor provide a set of 
specific rules for franchising contracts. These contracts are accepted under the 
principle of freedom of contract provided for the Civil Code (Article 405), 
according to which within the limits of the law, parties are freely entitled to fix 
the content of contracts, to conclude contracts different from those which are 
provided in this code or to insert therein clauses as they may wish (par. 1); 
moreover, parties can also join in the same contract rules of two or more 
contracts, totally or partially regulated by legislation (par. 2). 
For contracts in general (rectius, negócios jurídicos), the Civil Code 
provides a set of general principles and rules concerning namely the formation 
of the contract, capacity of parties, declarations of will, object, efficacy, as well 
as the regulation of certain preparatory pacts, such as promissory contracts and 
preference agreements, and breach of contract in general. Together with 
general principles and rules, certain special acts are applicable to franchising 
contracts, concerning notably standard terms (Decree-Law 446/85, as amended 
by Decrees-Law 220/95 and 249/99), product liability (Decree-Law 383/89, as 
amended by Decree-Law 131/2001), competition (Law 19/2012) and industrial 
property (Decree-Law 36/2003, as last amended by Decree-Law 143/2008). 
Moreover, it’s commonly understood that relevant provisions of the Agency Act 
may apply, by analogy, to some aspects of distribution contracts, notably 
commercial concession and franchising, and particularly concerning the 
termination of contracts.7 
This Act does not provide specific duties to provide pre-contractual 
information, but the vacuum of special legislation does not mean a legal 
vacuum concerning the formation of franchising contracts. 
 
5. Good faith negotiations and culpa in contrahendo 
To begin with, the general principles and rules of contract law are to be 
considered. In particular, the culpa in contrahendo doctrine, codified under 
Article 227(1) of the Civil Code, is deemed to have a relevant role to play in the 
field of franchising8. According to this provision, contracting parties shall act in 
conformity with good-faith both in preliminary negotiations and in clause 
drafting, otherwise they shall be liable for compensation of damages caused 
with fault to one another. This legal provision establishes the principle of good-
faith (bona fides) in objective sense, i.e., as a source of duties of care and 
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 See António Pinto Monteiro, Contratos de distribuição comercial, cit., 63-4, 67-9. For 
recent jurisprudence, see Supreme Court of Justice, judgments of 9 January 2007 (Proc. 
06A4416), 5 March 2009 (Proc. 09B0297), 25 January 2011 (Proc. 6350/06.5TVLSB.P1.S1), 27 
October 2011 (Proc. 8559-06.2TBBRG.G1.S1) and 15 November 2012 (Proc. 
1147/06.5TBCLD.L1.S1); Coimbra Court of Appeals, judgment of 14 February 2012 (Proc. 
3863/07.5TBVIS.C1); Lisbon Court of Appeals, Judgments of 22 March 2011 (Proc. 
1807/08.6TVLSB.L1-7), 10 December 2009 (Proc. 6240.05.9TVLSB.L1-7), 20 December 2011 
(Proc. 303024/10.7YIPRT.P1); Oporto Court of Appeals, judgments of 19 May 2010 (Proc. 
6350/06.5TVLSB.P1), 20 December 2011 (Proc. 303024/10.7YIPRT.P1). 
Notwithstanding the analogical application of relevant provisions of the Agency Act to 
franchising agreements these could be assimilated by the notion of enterprise lease - Alexandre 
Dias Pereira, ‘Da franquia de empresa (franchising)’, BFD 73 (1997), p. 251-278. The Oporto 
Court of Appeals, in judgment of 15 July 2009 (Proc. 589/06.0TVPRT.P1), seems to accept this 
opinion (“da conjugação de todos estes traços definidores e do tipo de cláusulas existentes e 
em presença no contrato de franchising, somos de opinião que a renda que é paga pelo 
franquiado tem uma natureza em tudo idêntica à do art. 1022º do CC, ou seja, trata-se de uma 
renda a pagar enquanto durar o contrato e com a finalidade essencial de retribuição pelo uso e 
fruição da marca e dos serviços de marketing, sendo fixada logo na celebração do contrato, 
ainda que actualizável.”). However, the Supreme Court of Justice has refused it in judgment of 
19 October 2010 (Proc. 2114/06.4TVPRT.P1.S1: “4) No contrato de franquia as rendas 
(‘royalties’) não representam, apenas, a contrapartida de utilização de um bem, como acontece 
no contrato de locação, mas incluem várias outras, como a assistência, a colocação no 
mercado de um produto com nome comercial firmado, e ainda amortização de equipamento, 
custos de gestão e da assistência prestada.”). 
8
 António Menezes Cordeiro, Manual de direito comercial, 2.ª ed., Coimbra, 2007, p. 692; 
L. Miguel Pestana de Vasconcelos, O contrato de franquia, cit., 78-80. 
loyalty between contracting parties in negotiations9, the violation of which is 
deemed a source of liability.10 
The obligation of the parties to negotiate in good faith means the 
obligation to provide all the pre-contractual information that is convenient and 
justified so that the other party decides whether and how the contract should be 
entered into.11 The sensitive value of this obligation concerning franchising 
contracts has already been pointed out by the Courts.12 
Arguments of information asymmetries as well as the contract long term 
character can be used to reinforce the obligation to provide pre-contractual 
information at the stage of formation of franchising contracts, but Courts usually 
ground their judgments upon the principle of good faith, due diligence and 
confidence.13 
The Supreme Court delivered a judgment on 19 October 2010 (Proc. nº 
2114/06.4TVPRT.P1.S1 ) according to which parties should comply with 
information and loyalty duties, in order to avoid situations of belief or 
semblance, from which damages could arise.14 
In its judgment of 19 May 2009 (Proc. 8685/08-7), the Lisbon Court of 
Appeals hold that the duty of loyalty imposed by good faith must be observed in 
the preliminary negotiations of a contract and requires that parties shall omit 
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 See notably Supreme Court of Justice, judgment of 16 December 2010 (Proc. 
4/07.1TBGDL.E1.S1). 
10
 The legal nature of liability for culpa in contrahendo is a disputed question. In recent 
judgments, the Supreme Court of Justice held that liability for culpa in contrahendo is a tertium 
genus of liability between breach of contract and torts - Judgments of 20 March 2012 (Proc. 
1903/06.4TVLSB.L1.S1), 27 September 2012 (Proc. 3729/04.0TVLSB.L1.S1), and 20 October 
2012 (Proc. 2625/09.0TVLSB.L1. S1). In doctrine see notably Jorge Sinde Monteiro, 
Responsabilidade por conselhos, recomendações e informações, Coimbra, 1989, p. 516, Luis 
Manuel de Menezes Leitão, Direito das Obrigações, I, 8ª ed., Coimbra, 2009, p. 361. On the 
tertium genus of civil liability see also e.g. Manuel Carneiro da Frada, Teoria da confiança e 
responsabilidade civil, Coimbra, 2004. 
11
 See notably Carlos Alberto da Mota Pinto, A responsabilidade pré-negocial pela não 
conclusão dos contratos, Coimbra, 1963, Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, Responsabilidade Civil 
pela ruptura das negociações preparatórias de um contrato”, Coimbra, 1994. 
12
 See e.g. Lisbon Court of Appeals, judgment of 19 May 2009 (Proc. 8685/08-7); Oporto 
Court of Appeals, judgment of 2 July 2009 (Proc. 373/07.4TVPRT.P1). 
13
 See for ex. Supreme Court of Justice, judgments of 27 September 2012 (Proc. 
3729/04.0TVLSB.L1.S1), and 20 October 2012 (Proc. 2625/09.0TVLSB.L1. S1). Franchising 
contracts which are concluded due to error of the parties, either innocent (misrepresentation) or 
intentional (fraud), are voidable according to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. For ex., 
where breach of pre-contractual information is fraudulent the consequence is also voidability of 
the contract (Civil Code, Articles 253 and 254), notwithstanding liability for culpa in contrahendo 
- see Lisbon Court of Appeals, judgment of 27 September 2007 (Proc. N.º 6592/2007-6).  
14
 “Pela tutela da confiança, devem as partes cumprir todos os deveres de lealdade e de 
informação que ao caso caibam, de modo a evitar criar situações de crença ou de aparência 
das quais possam emergir danos.” 
statements that conform to their beliefs and expectations but are still unproven, 
if they are suitable to enhance confidence in the viability of an already created 
project and lead a counterparty to continue the investments in view of a 
projected business.15 
The Oporto Court of Appeals in its judgment of 2 July 2009 (Proc. 
373/07.4TVPRT.P1) analyzed the obligation to provide pre-contractual 
information, holding that three duties arise from the obligation to act in 
accordance with the principle of good faith, applied on the stage of negotiations: 
 
a) a duty of protection, meaning that parties should avoid 
actions that could cause damages to the other party; 
b) a duty of information, considering the possibly relevant 
circumstances for a consensus with the other negotiating party, with 
particular intensity where she is a weaker party;  
c) a duty of loyalty, meaning the obligation to avoid unfair 
practices towards the other party, including unjustified breach of 
negotiations of a contract in the conclusion of which the other party had 
justified and legitimate expectations. 
 
On the other hand, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice 
stresses the normative value of good-faith and confidence in business 
transactions. In its judgment of 31 March 2011 (Proc. 3682/05.3TVSLB.L1.S1), 
the Supreme Court held that the refusal to sign a contract after reaching an 
agreement on all its terms is a matter of pre-contractual liability for culpa in 
contrahendo, not for the refusal itself but for the confidence and legitimate 
expectancies that have been created and then frustrated without fair 
justification.16 
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 “O dever de lealdade integrador da boa fé que deve nortear as negociações 
preliminares de um contrato impõe que qualquer das partes omita afirmações, conformes às 
suas convicções e expectativas mas ainda não comprovadas, se as mesmas forem idóneas 
para reforçar a confiança já criada na viabilidade do projecto e levar a contraparte a fazer e 
prosseguir na realização de investimentos com vista ao negócio projectado.” 
16
 S.T.J., Acórdão de 31 de Março de 2011 – Processo n.º 3682/05.3 TVSLB.L1.S1 
(Responsabilidade pré-contratual: aplicação do critério do interesse contratual negativo ao 
cálculo da indemnização pela recusa injustificada da formalização de um contrato negociado) – 
anotação de M.J. Almeida Costa / Henrique Sousa Antunes, RLJ, ano 141 (2012), p. 309. 
Later, in its judgment of 6 November 2012 (Proc. 
4068/06.8TBCSC.L1.S1), the Supreme Court of Justice pointed out that good-
faith imposes duties of information, protection and loyalty in the formation of 
contract, and that Article 227(1) of the Civil Code includes not only the breach of 
negotiations but also the conclusion of ineffective contracts and the protection 
against undesired contracts, i.e. the conclusion of a contract which does not 
correspond to what the other contracting party might expect based upon 
erroneous information provided  by the other party or omission of due 
clarification. However, in the opinion of the Court, in order to ascertain the fault 
of the parties it is required to take into account not only the principle of good 
faith but also other basic principles of private contract law such as autonomy of 
will and the equilibrium of obligations.  
In our opinion, the obligation to negotiate in good faith also means that 
during preliminary negotiations parties shall not engage in unfair competition 
practices, such as misleading or deceiveful statements, and breach of 
confidenciality (Articles 317 and 318 of the Code of Industrial Property). 
 
6. Disputed issues, in special eligible damages in pre-contractual 
liability 
It’s not undisputed whether liability for culpa in contrahendo requires 
intentional fault, whether it only takes place in case of non conclusion of 
contract (e.g. unjustified breach of negotiations or refusal to sign in due form a 
fully agreed contract), and whether compensation shall cover only negative 
damages (e.g. expenses incurred due to negotiations) or also positive damages 
(i.e. profits or results reasonably expected to be achieved by the other party 
upon conclusion and due execution of the contract). 
The wording of the Civil Code does not require intentional fault, 
nonetheless the level of fault shall be considered in assessing compensation 
(Article 488). Moreover, compensation should take place despite the parties 
have entered into the contract. For ex., expenses have been produced upon the 
legitimate expectation of a certain outcome, but the final result as agreed is far 
lower than such investments. This solution has recently been adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Justice17. 
On the other hand, in principle, only negative damage is to be 
compensated.18 The Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment of 31 March 2011 
(Proc. 3682/05.3TVSLB.L1.S1), held that compensation for negative contractual 
damage (dano de confiança) is measured upon the difference between the 
present economic situation of the injured and the situation in which he would be 
in case he did not enter into negotiations, and therefore only damages 
consisting of expenses incurred due to negotiations would be eligible for 
compensation. As for expected profits and results with the conclusion and 
execution of the contract19 these would not be eligible for compensation, liability 
for culpa in contrahendo not being a matter of breach of contract. 
Nonetheless, certain damages or economic losses, such as the loss of 
chance of a different business the party had to abide from, should be taken into 
account. The Supreme Court of Justice, in its judgments of 12 January 2009 
(Proc. 08B4052) and December 2011 (Proc. 1807/08.6TVLSB.L1.S1) 
recognizes that, exceptionally, positive damages should be eligible for 
compensation, notably where the contract is voided. 
In judgment of 20 March 2012 (Proc. 1903/06.4TVLSB.L1.S1) the 
Supreme Court of Justice seems to allow a less restrictive approach, as positive 
damages are placed in almost equal footing to negative damages concerning 
eligibility for compensation in pre-contractual liability.20 However, in judgment of 
                                                          
17
 Judgment of 15 May 2012 (Proc. 6440/09.2TVLSB.L1.S1: “A celebração do contrato 
ou a sua anulação, não afastam a aplicação desta responsabilidade.”). In doctrine see notably 
Jorge Sinde Monteiro, Responsabilidade por conselhos, recomendações ou informações, cit., 
p. 358, 360. 
18
 Supreme Court of Justice, judgment of 12 January 2009 (Proc. 08B4052); Lisbon Court 
of Appeals, judgment of 22 March 2011 (Proc. 1807/08.6TVLSB.L1-7: “Essa indemnização 
abrange os lucros cessantes consistentes na medida do benefício que o lesado teria auferido 
se não fosse a existência e subsistência do contrato (dano negativo ou de confiança), e não 
aqueles medidos pelo benefício do lesado decorrentes da prestação debitória do devedor 
(dano positivo ou de cumprimento).”). 
19
 Mário Júlio de Almeida Costa, Direito das obrigações, 9ª ed., Coimbra, 2008, p. 548 
(“A indemnização pelo dano positivo destina-se a colocar o lesado na situação em que se 
encontraria se o contrato fosse exactamente cumprido. Reconduz-se, assim, aos prejuízos que 
decorrem do não cumprimento definitivo do contrato ou do seu cumprimento tardio ou 
defeituoso. Ao passo que a indemnização do dano negativo tende a repor o lesado na situação 
em que estaria se não houvesse celebrado o contrato, ou mesmo iniciado as negociações com 
vista à respectiva conclusão.”). 
20
 “VII - Os danos indemnizáveis, em sede responsabilidade pré-contratual, por violação 
dos deveres de informação e esclarecimento, conducentes à outorga de um contrato 
27 September 2012 (Proc. 3729/04.0TVLSB.L1.S1), the Supreme Court 
decided that pre-contractual liability may cover contractual positive damages 
where negotiations have a level which justifies legitimate confidence in the 
conclusion of the contract.21 Later on, in judgment of 20 October 2012 (Proc. 
2625/09.0TVLSB.L1. S1), the Supreme Court of Justice held that positive 
contract damage may be covered by pre-contractual liability compensation, in 
extreme cases and according to the concrete circumstances of the case, where 
a global agreement already existed and only formalization of the contract was 
missing.22 In legal doctrine it is submitted the concept of a binding informal pre-
contract23 and it has also been argued compensation for positive damages 
notably in case of breach of a duty to conclude the contract.24 
Nonetheless, compensation for positive damages in pre-contractual 
liability should not be construed broadly, in particular where a legal requirement 
of formalization of the contract is not met. In fact, where legislation provides a 
special form for a contract to be validly concluded (e.g. public deed), a refusal to 
sign the contract in due form is a right of both parties. However, if the parties 
have fully agreed to the terms of the contract and moved forward with 
performing it, it is necessary to check whether the interests protected by the 
legal requirement of form are at stake where one of the parties argues the 
invalidity of the contract due to lack of form.25 There may be a situation of venire 
contra factum proprium, which is prohibited as abuse of right (Article 334 of the 
Civil Code). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
desvantajoso, abrangem quer o dano da confiança (interesse contratual negativo), quer o dano 
do cumprimento (interesse contratual positivo).” 
21
 “IV. A responsabilidade pré-contratual abarca o dano contratual negativo – o dano que 
o lesado não teria se não tivesse encetado as negociações – e pode abarcar o dano contratual 
positivo – quando as negociações tiverem atingido um nível tal que justifique a confiança na 
celebração do negócio.” 
22
 “I - A responsabilidade civil pré-contratual não se confunde com a responsabilidade 
civil contratual, nem com a responsabilidade civil extracontratual, constituindo um tertium genus 
de responsabilidade civil. II - Neste tipo de responsabilidade a indemnização abrange o 
interesse contratual negativo, podendo, em casos limites e de acordo com as circunstâncias 
concretas do caso, incluir o interesse contratual positivo, se já existia um acordo global e 
faltava apenas a formalização do negócio.” 
23
 Carlos Ferreira de Almeida, ‘Contrato formal e pré-contrato informal’, Comemorações 
dos 35 Anos do Código Civil e dos 25 Anos da Reforma de 1977, II, Coimbra, 2006. 
24
 See notably Paulo Mota Pinto, Interesse contratual positivo e interesse contratual 
negativo, II, Coimbra, 2009, p. 1347-8; Nuno M. Pinto de Oliveira, Princípios de direito dos 
contratos, Coimbra, 2011. 
25
 See Almeida Costa, Sousa Antunes, Anotação, cit., p. 229-30, with more references. 
It should be remarked that franchising contracts are atypical contracts 
under Portuguese private law, meaning that no legal requirement of form is 
provided for the validity of these contracts. Therefore, where parties have fully 
agreed to the terms of the contract and initiated to perform it, it seems that the 
contract has been tacitly concluded (Article 217 of Civil Code). 
Finally, there is no deadline specific of franchising agreements to claim 
compensation for damages due to breach of pre-contractual information. 
Nonetheless, in case of culpa in contrahendo, the Civil Code provides a 
prescription term of 3 years to claim compensation for damages (Articles 227(2) 
and 498). 
 
 
7. Franchising contracts as possible standard contracts 
Where a franchising agreement contains standard terms, the Act on 
Standard Terms26 shall apply. The scope of application of this Act includes 
general contract clauses drafted without individual previous negotiation which 
are subscribed or accepted respectively by indeterminate proponents or 
addressees as well as clauses inserted in individual contracts the content of 
which could not be negotiated by the other party (Article 1(1)(2)), regardless of 
the drafter of such clauses, including third parties (Article 2). 
This Act provides an obligation of full disclosure of the standard terms so 
that in the first place the franchisee is able to know them. In fact, the proponent 
must communicate the general clauses in full, by adequate means and with 
necessary previous notice, so that, considering the importance of the contract 
and the extension and complexity of the clauses, their complete and effective 
knowledge is possible for a party with normal diligence (Article 5(1)(2)). On the 
other hand, the proponent has an obligation to inform and to clarify any 
reasonable doubt of the franchisee concerning such standard terms (Article 6). 
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 Decree-Law 446/85, as amended by Decrees-Law 220/95 and 249/99. See notably 
M.J. de Almeida Costa, Síntese do regime jurídico vigente das cláusulas contratuais gerais, 9.ª 
ed., Lisboa, 2007, Idem, António Menezes Cordeiro, Cláusulas contratuais gerais. anotação ao 
Decreto-Lei n.º 446/85, de 25 de Outubro, Coimbra, 1990; António Pinto Monteiro, ‘Contratos 
de adesão (o regime jurídico das cláusulas contratuais gerais instituído pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 
446/85, de 25 de Outubro)’ ROA (1986), e ‘O novo regime jurídico dos contratos de 
adesão/cláusulas contratuais gerais’, ROA (2002); J. Sousa Ribeiro, O problema do contrato – 
As cláusulas contratuais gerais e o princípio da liberdade contratual, Coimbra, 1999. 
In case the obligations to communicate and to inform/clarify are not 
complied with, the concerned standard terms are deemed to be excluded from 
the contract; the same applies to the so-called surprise terms (Article 8). 
Moreover, the Act on standard terms provides a content control of the 
standard contract prohibiting those clauses which are against good faith (Article 
15), by means of a list of dark clauses - i.e. clauses which are absolutely 
deemed null and void -, and a list of grey clauses - i.e. clauses the validity of 
which depends upon the relevant standard business framework (quadro 
negocial padrozinado). Amongst these, and concerning standard contracts 
between companies or professionals, there are standard clauses providing for 
penalty clauses which are not proportional to eligible damages, as well as 
clauses which allow one of the parties to, immediately or without sufficient 
notice and adequate compensation, terminate the contract, where this has 
required from the other party to make considerable investments or expenses 
(Article 19(c) and (f)). 
Despite these are grey clauses, meaning that their conformity with good-
faith has to be assessed in according with the standard business framework, 
they are nonetheless sensitive clauses concerning in particular franchising 
agreements. In order to find out the franchising standard business framework 
some soft law instruments may prove relevant, notably the European Code of 
Ethics. 
 
8. The European Code of Ethics and the Unidroit Model Franchise 
Disclosure Law 
Portuguese legislation has no specific regulation designed for franchising 
contracts, but the general principles of contract law, such as the principle to 
negotiate in good faith, as well the regulation of standard terms provide a 
normative basis for the obligation to provide pre-contractual information 
between negotiating parties. 
In order to fulfill general concepts and indeterminate legal notions, soft law 
instruments may prove relevant. In particular, the European Code of Ethics for 
Franchising27 is effective in Portugal since 1991. Part 3 of this Code provides 
that, 
 
3.1 Advertising for the recruitment of Individual Franchisees shall be 
free of ambiguity and misleading statements; 
3.2 Any recruitment, advertising and publicity material, containing 
direct or indirect references to future possible results, figures or earnings 
to be expected by Individual Franchisees, shall be objective and shall not 
be misleading; 
3.3 In order to allow prospective Individual Franchisees to enter into 
any binding document with full knowledge, they shall be given a copy of 
the present Code of Ethics as well as full and accurate written disclosure 
of all information material to the franchise relationship, within a reasonable 
time prior to the execution of these binding documents; 
3.4 If a Franchisor imposes a Pre-contract on a candidate Individual 
Franchisee, the following principles should be respected: 
- prior to the signing of any pre-contract, the candidate Individual 
Franchisee should be given written information on its purpose and on any 
consideration he may be required to pay to the Franchisor to cover the 
latter’s actual expenses, incurred during and with respect to the pre-
contract phase; if the agreement is executed, the said consideration 
should be reimbursed by the Franchisor or set off against a possible entry 
fee to be paid by the Individual Franchisee; 
- the Pre-contract shall define its term and include a termination 
clause; 
- the Franchisor can impose non-competition and/or secrecy 
clauses to protect its know-how and identity. 
 
On the other hand, the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (Unidroit), of which Portugal is a Member, issued on September 2002, an 
instrument regarding franchise, the Model Franchise Disclosure Law, containing 
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 European Franchise Federation - European Code of Ethics for Franchising, 
http://www.eff-franchise.com/ 
provisions regarding the obligation of delivery, format and contents of the 
disclosure document.28 
Despite it is not binding, the Model Franchise Disclosure Law can be 
followed, as a framework, regarding the obligation to provide pre-contractual 
information, in special concerning arbitration and equitable judgments. 
 
9. Term to submit and minimum content of the pre-contractual 
information document  
There is no legal term to submit the pre-contractual information document. 
However, pursuant to article 227(1) of the Civil Code and taking into account 
the European Code of Ethics for Franchising (3.3 – “within a reasonable time 
prior to the execution of”), in practice it is often given a reasonable period of 
time to the Franchisee to study and to decide whether it wants to sign or not the 
binding document. The reasonable period of time, which depends on the 
complexity and/or state of pre-contractual negotiations, is usually stipulated 
between 15 days to one month. Notwithstanding, the rules of Civil Code on offer 
and acceptance of proposals are to be observed (Articles 228 et seq.). 
Moreover, there is no specific legal obligation detailing or listing the 
content of the information. However, pursuant to the principle of good faith, the 
franchisor should provide all the relevant and convenient information to allow 
the prospective franchisee to take a duly based decision on whether he should 
enter into the contract. The information to be provided varies in accordance with 
the circumstances of each case. 
 
Concerning soft law instruments, § 3.3 of the European Code of Ethics 
provides that franchisees are entitled to receive “full and accurate written 
disclosure of all information material to the franchise relationship”. According to 
§ 5.4 of this Code, the essential minimum terms of the agreement are: 
 
a) the rights granted to the Franchisor; 
b) the rights granted to the Individual Franchisee; 
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 http://www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2002franchise/2002modellaw-e.pdf 
c) the goods and/or services to be provided to the Individual 
Franchisee; 
d) the obligations of the Franchisor; 
e) the obligations of the Individual Franchisee; 
f) the terms of payment by the Individual Franchisee; 
g) the duration of the agreement which should be long enough to 
allow Individual Franchisees to amortize their initial investments specific to 
the franchise; 
h) the basis for any renewal of the agreement; 
i) the terms upon which the Individual Franchisee may sell or 
transfer the franchised business and the Franchisor’s possible pre-
emption rights in this respect; 
j) provisions relevant to the use by the Individual Franchisee of the 
Franchisor’s distinctive signs, trade name, trademark, service mark, store 
sign, logo or other distinguishing identification; 
k) the Franchisor’s right to adapt the franchise system to new or 
changed methods; 
l) provisions for termination of the agreement; 
m) provisions for surrendering promptly upon termination of the 
franchise agreement any tangible and intangible property belonging to the 
Franchisor or other owner thereof. 
 
Comparative outlook and conclusion 
There is no domestic regulation specific of franchising contracts in 
Portugal, but at the same time there is not a situation of legal vacuum 
concerning the obligation to provide pre-contractual information in the formation 
of the contract. 
To begin with, parties are liable for culpa in contrahendo as they have the 
obligation to act in good faith in preliminary negotiations, i.e., to provide all the 
pre-contractual information that is convenient and justified so that the other 
party decides whether and how the contract should be entered into. The 
sensitive value of this obligation in the field of franchising contracts has already 
been pointed out by the Courts. 
On the other hand, franchising agreements may qualify as standard terms. 
Portuguese legislation provides special duties of communication, information 
and clarification upon those who propose standard terms, which may prove 
rather relevant for franchising. 
Furthermore, parties can refer to soft law instruments, such as the 
European Code of Ethics for Franchising and the Unidroit Model Franchise 
Disclosure Law. 
Protection of the weaker party as a basic principle of contract law29 as well 
as the principle of legal certainty, could justify the adoption of a special 
regulatory instrument concerning pre-contractual information based upon the 
Unidroit Model Franchise Disclosure Law. Other countries have already 
adopted special provision, notably the USA, France (Loi Doubin of 31 
December 1989), and Italy (Norme per la disciplina dell’affiliazione 
commerciale, Legge 6 maggio 2004, n. 129), as well as some Portuguese 
speaking countries or regions.30 
In the US, the franchisor has the duty to provide a Franchise Disclosure 
Document (FDD) at least fourteen days before any payment is made or a 
franchise agreement is signed. The FDD shall in principle include audited 
financial statements from the franchisor in a particular format (1), data of 
franchisees in the licensed territory (names, addresses and telephone numbers) 
for consultation before taking the franchise (2), estimate of global franchise 
revenues and franchisor profitability (3). 
In Europe, French Loi Doubin of 31 December 1989, later incorporated 
into the Code of Commerce (Article L 330-3 code de commerce), is the first 
European franchise disclosure law. The disclosure document, which is 
confidential, must be delivered at least 20 days before any payment or 
execution of the agreement takes place. The disclosure document shall include 
the date of the founding of the franchisor's enterprise and a summary of its 
business history and all information necessary to assess the business 
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 The application of the law of the country of establishment of the franchisee, as 
provided for under Rome I on the law applicable to franchising contracts, seems to be 
influenced by such principle. Article 1(4)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16. 
30
 Curiously, Angola has a specific Act on Distribution Contracts, including franchising 
(Law 18/03, of 12 August – agency, franchising, and commercial concession), but it does not 
provide a specific obligation to provide pre-contractual information in franchising contracts. 
experience of the franchisor, including bankers (a), description of the local 
market for the goods or service (b), the franchisor's financial statements for the 
previous two years (c), a list of all other franchisees currently in the network (d), 
all franchisees who have left the network during the preceding year, whether by 
termination or non-renewal (e), the conditions for renewal, assignment, 
termination and the scope of exclusivity (f). 
Concerning Portuguese speaking countries or regions, the Brazilian 
Franchise Law 8.955/1994 (“dispõe sobre o contrato de franquia empresarial 
(franchising) e dá outras providências”) provides a mandatory disclosure 
document before performance of the agreement, failure to disclose it voiding the 
agreement and leading to refunds and payments for damages (Article 3). On 
the other side of the planet, the Commercial Code of Macau, enacted by 
Decree-Law 40/99/M of 3 August 199931, establishes a detailed obligation to 
provide pre-contractual information and clarification (Article 680). This 
information is aimed to allow the franchisee to form a balanced and informed 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the contract. As examples 
of information that the franchiser must provide we can mention namely his 
identification and two last exercises annual accounts, the specifications as to 
the estimated sum of the initial investment needed for acquisition, installation 
and entry into functioning of the franchise, the composition of the franchise 
network, lists of franchisees, sub-franchisees and sub-franchisers of the 
network, as well as of those who have left the network in the last 12 months, 
and also, for example, any services that the franchiser obliges himself to render 
to the franchisee during the duration of the contract. In case this obligation is 
not complied with by the franchiser, the franchisee is entitled to demand 
annulment of the contract thereof. 
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 The Commercial Code is based upon the tradition of European Civil Law countries, and 
represents an important legacy of Portuguese legal heritage to this Special Administrative 
Region of the P.R. China. In systematic terms, the Code is divided in 4 books. Book I concerns 
the exercise of commercial enterprise in general (e.g., obligations of merchants, protection and 
negotiation of enterprises). Book II regulates the exercise of a collective enterprise and the 
cooperation in the exercise of an enterprise (company law and related entities). Book III 
concerns the external activity of an enterprise (i.e., commercial contracts such as, for example, 
agency, franchise, leasing, and independent guarantees). Book IV concerns negotiable 
instruments (e.g., bills of exchange). On this Code see notably Jianhong Fan & Alexandre Dias 
Pereira, Commercial and Economic Law in Macau. 2.ª ed. The Hague, 2011. 
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